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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"You're seeing windmills that don't exist. Rather than add
all of those amendments, I'd rather let the whole thing go.
Then the courts will adopt a common law right of privacy. '"13
The legislative efforts in establishing a statutory right of privacy
as recommended by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Judevine
case and affirmed in the Distenfeld decision were summarily stale-
mated. Subsequent attempts to introduce such bills were also stymied
by press opposition. Despite this apparent inability on the part of the
Legislature to create a statutory right of privacy the court has refused
to recognize a common law right of privacy. The transcending question
is patent: With an awareness of the apparent inability of the Wis-
consin Legislature to enact suitable legal safeguards for such situa-
tions as presented in the instant case, will the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin continue to be bound by stare decisis or will they follow the
lead of the majority in creating and recognizing the right of privacy
by judicial decision? Recognition of this right appears to be the mod-
ern trend. In one form or another, the right of privacy is presently
recognized in all states except Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and Texas.1 4
Two courses are open to establish a right of privacy, namely, legis-
lative action or judicial decision. The 1957 Legislature should clearly
define the right or the court will have to overrule its prior decisions.
The latter course appears hopeless. A middle ground might be open
to our court if the situation presented itself. Upon being confronted
with an invasion of a citizen's privacy, through the medium of com-
mercial advertising, our court could follow the Michigan decision and
adopt a limited right of privacy. The Court could find that this type
of invasion is at variance with the invasions ruled upon in the Jude-
vine, Distenfeld and the instant case.
Considering our media of modern communication, especially with
the advent of television, the dilemma is brought into sharp focus. As
of this date, discounting legislative success in obtaining statutory rec-
ognition of the rgiht, Wisconsin remains remediless for violations of
a right which inheres in every one of us.
RICHARD GLEN GREENWOOD
Emergency Vehicles-Standard of Care-The accident giving
rise to this litigation occurred when two girls, ten and eight years
old, were struck by an ambulance which was conveying a patient to
the hospital. The ambulance was preceded by a motorcycle escort.
Both vehicles had red lights and sirens in operation and were travel-
ing west at a speed estimated at forty to fifty miles per hour. Traffic
at the intersection had stopped and the driver of the ambulance had
13Senator Warren Knowles, Milwaukee Journal, May 17, 1951, p.11.
14 PROSSER, HORNBROOK ON TORTS 636 (2d ed. 1955).
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swung his vehicle into the south lane to go around the lines of
traffic. The girls were struck as they stepped off of the safety island
in the middle of the street and began to cross the south lane.
The trial court found the defendant-ambulance driver causally
negligent as to speed and lookout and it found the girls negligent in
failing to hear the siren. The negligence was apportioned 80% to the
defendant and 20% to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
affirmed the decision. Montalto v. Fond du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552,
76 N.W. 2d 279 (1955).
The case raises the problem of the standard of care required of
an emergency vehicle. The decision turns on the construction given
to Secs. 85.12 (5) and 85.40 (5) of the WISCONSIN STATUTES.'
In construing statutes similar to these, there appears to be two
views prevalent in the majority of state courts.
The first of these views is characterized by the decision of Lucas
v. City of Los Angeles in which the court held:
"Emergency vehicles are exempted from observing speed limits
and other rules of the road providing they use due re-
gard for the safety of others and are not guilty of an arbitrary
exercise of the privilege. This due care consists in giving ade-
quate warning so that other drivers have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to yield the right of way."
'2
The court further stated that since emergency vehicles are ex-
empted from the speed and movement regulations, negligence cannot
be predicated on these elements if proper warning has been given.3
Thus the giving of proper warning is the measure of due care
and once this warning has been given the driver of an emergency ve-
hicle cannot be held liable for negligence unless it can be proven that
he acted arbitrarily in the exercise of the privilege granted by the
statute.
IWIs. STATS. §85.12 (5) (1953).
"The provisions of said section regulating the movement, parking and
standing of vehicles shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles while
the operator of such vehicle is operating the same in an emergency in the
necessary performance of public duties. This exemption shall not, however,
protect the operator of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless
disregard of the safety of others."
Wis. Stats §85.40 (5) (1953).
"The speed limitations set forth in this section shall not apply to authorized
emregency vehicles when responding to emergency calls and the operators
thereof sound audible signal by siren or exhaust whistle, and when such
emergency vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red
light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500
feet to the front of such vehicle. This provision shall not relieve the operator
of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate with due re-
gard for the safety of all persons using the highway, nor shall it protect
the operator of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disre-
gard of the safety of others."
2 Lucas v. iCty of Los Angeles. 10 Cal.2d 476, 75 P.2d 599, at 602 (1938).
3 Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, supra, note 2.
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Therefore, the only limitation on the exemption granted by the
statute is that the driver's conduct shall not amount to an arbitrary
exercise of this privilege. The court in the Lucas case further stated
that excessive speed alone would not constitute an arbitrary exercise
of the privilege. The Lucas case and subsequent cases enumerated the
following as examples of an arbitrary exercise of the privilege: (a)
emergency operation when an emergency does not exist; (b) emer-
gency operation on routine runs; (c) where warning is given but the
driver sees that others have not heard it or are not heeding it; and (d)
when the conduct of the driver is so reckless that it amounts to wilful
misconduct.4
Thus, under the California view there are three questions:
(1) Was the vehicle on an emergency run?3
(2) Was the siren sounding so as to give others a reasonable
opportunity to yield the right of way?
(3) Was there an arbitrary exercise of the privilege?6
The second view7 interpreting emergency-vehicle statutes is charac-
terized by the decision of Russel v. Nadeau:
"The right of way given to emergency vehicles and their ex-
emption from traffic regulations does not relieve their oper-
ators from the duty of using due care. They are bound to exer-
cise reasonable precautions against the extraordinary dangers
their duty compels them to create. They must consider their
speed and the measure of their responsibility is due care under
the circumstances." 8
Under this view, the driver of an emergency vehicle can be held
liable for negligence as to speed and movement regardless of the ex-
emption granted by the statute. It isn't necessary for the plaintiff to
prove reckless conduct or an arbitrary exercise of the privilege but
proof of ordinary negligence will be sufficient to attach liability.
This view is summed up by the Michigan Supreme Court in
City of Kalamazoo v. Priests:
"Statutes serve to relieve the drivers of emergency vehicles
only from those duties imposed on other drivers which relate to
the observance of speed limits, stop signs and right of way. The
4 Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 2.; Coltman v. City of Beverly Hills
40 CA. 2d 570, 105 P. 2d 153 (1940) ; Goldstein v. Rogers 208 P. 2d 719 (1949).
5 Whether an emergency existed depends upon the nature of the call received
and the situation presented to the driver at the time. See Lucas v. City of
Los Angeles, supra, note 2.6 Coltman v. City of Beverly Hills, supra, note 4.
7 For other cases following this view see: Reilly v. City of Philadelphia, 328
Pa. 563, 195 Atl. 897 (1938); Roadmann v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 108 A2d
754 (1954) ; Archer v. Johnson, 90 Ga. App. 148, 82 SE. 2d 314 (1954) ; Mc-
Dermott v. Irwin, 148 Ohio St. 67, 73 NE. 2d 86 (1948) ; and OHio GENERAL
CODE .3714-1 (1940).
S Russell v. Nadeau, 139 1Me. 286, 29A.2d 916, at 917 (1943).
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language contains not the slightest intention of the legislature
to excuse such drivers from other duties. The opposite purpose
is evident from the fact that they signaled out speed limits, stop
signs, and right of way as exceptions and by the selfsame sta-
tutes required that such vehicles be driven with due regard for
the safety of others." 9
Many duties are imposed upon drivers of motor vehicles. Some are
the result of express statutory provisions to observe speed limits, stop
signs and right of way; a violation of these statutory provisions may
result in a presumption of negligence or in some jurisdictions negli-
gence per se. Other duties are imposed by custom and are inherent
in the exercise of due care which constitutes freedom from negligence.
These duties are: to maintain a proper management and control; to
maintain a proper lookout; to maintain the vehicle in proper condi-
tion; and to drive at a rate of speed that is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.
The exemptions granted by the statutes under this view serve only
to exempt the drivers of emergency vehicles from those arbitrary
standards of speed and right of way as prescribed by the Legislature;
they do not relieve the drivers of their common-law duty of exercising
due care under the circumstances but expressly provide that due care
shall be exercised regardless of the exemptions granted.
Therefore, from consideration of the cases following this view, it
can be inferred that a driver of an emergency vehicle may be held
liable when it can be proven that he failed to use reasonable care as
to speed, lookout, management and control or any other common-law
duty required of a driver of a motor vehicle. This lack of due care
need not be gross negligence or wilful misconduct but proof of ordi-
nary negligence will be sufficient to attach liaibility.' 0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in reaching their decision in the
present case considered both of these views and adopted, to some ex-
tent, the view of Russel v. Nadeau.
The court held that the WISCONSIN STATUTES exempted the drivers
of an emergency vehicle from observing the rules of the road as to
speed limits, stop signs, and regulations as to movement but did not
relieve them from the duty of due care.
This duty of due care is to allow others on the road a reasonable
opportunity to yield the right of way. Failure to allow others this
opportunity may result in ordinary negligence or recklessness depend-
ing upon the circumstances.11
9 City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 NW. 2d 52, at 54 (1951).
10 For other cases following this view see: Grammier-Dismukes Co. v. Payton,
Tex. Civ. App., 22 S.W. 2d 544 (1929); Johanson v. Baugher, 92 Colo. 588,
22 P. 2d 855 (1933) ; Hogle v. City of Minneapolis, 193 Minn. 326, 258 N.W.
721 (1935); City of Miami v. Thigpin, 11 So. 2d 300 (1943).11 Montalto v. Fond du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552, 76 N.W.2d 279, at 283 (1955).
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Sec. 85.12 (5) of the WISCONSIN STATUTES exempts drivers of emer-
gency vehicles from such rules of the road regarding the movement of
vehicles. However, the exemption granted by this statute is qualified
by a phrase prohibiting them from acting in reckless disregard for
the safety of others. Under this statute the driver can only be held for
reckless conduct when the case involves a question of right of way,
going through a stop sign or driving on the wrong side of the street.
In these cases, it is not sufficient to prove ordinary negligence be-
cause the statute prohibits them only from acting in reckless disre-
gard for the safety of others and says nothing about exercising due
care.
Sec. 85.40 (5) of the WISCONSIN STATUTES exempts drivers of
emergency vehicles from speed regulations. This exemption is qualified
by the same phrase prohibiting them from acting in reckless disregard
of the safety of others and it is further qualified by a phrase stating
that this exemption shall not relieve the driver from the duty of exerci-
sing due care for the safety of others. Under this statute, the Legisla-
ture intended a different measure of care and therefore in cases in-
volving speed it is necessary only to prove ordinary negligence.
The statutes are silent as to lookout. However, in the present case,
the court said:
"In our opinion, a driver must maintain an efficient lookout
regardless of his speed. Indeed, if his speed is greater than the
statutory limit, it is incumbent on him to maintain a sharper
lookout simply because he will have less time in which to react
to any hazard which may arise in his path."'12
The duty as to lookout is due care under the circumstances and
proof of ordinary negligence as to lookout will render the driver of
an emergency vehicle liable.
The Court did not consider management and control, condition of
the vehicle and other common law duties in this case. However, in
the light of this opinion, it seems safe to assume that they would
apply the same standard of due care to such duties as they have done
with reference to speed and lookout .
In summary, it would appear that in Wisconsin there are three
questions to be considered in any case involving an emergency ve-
hicle:
(1) Does the vehicle qualify as an emergency vehicle under
Sec. 85.10 (14) of the WISCONSIN ST-&TUTES which de-
fines emergency vehicles and under Sec. 85.20 of the
WISCONSIN STATUTES which requires them to give audible
warning to secure the right of way?
12 Ibid, at 285.
[Vol. 41
RECENT DECISIONS
(2) Was it on an emergency call at the time?13
(3) a) Was the driver operating his vehicle negligently as to
speed, lookout and management and control?
b) Was the driver operating his vehicle in a reckless man-
ner as to going through stop signs, driving on the wrong
side of the road, and right of way ?14
ROBERT WATSON
The Alcohol-blood test in Wisconsin-Wisconsin's legal position
in regard to the alcohol-blood test has recently been clarified in large
part by State v. Kroening (1956).1 Defendant was the driver of a
car which was involved in a head-on collision in the opposite lane
of travel. Four persons in the other vehicle were killed and defendant
was rendered unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where a nurse,
acting upon the order of the District Attorney, removed a small quan-
tity of blood from his arm for the purpose of obtaining a specimen
for an alcohol-blood test. At the time the blood was removed, defend-
ant was not under arrest and was still unconscious. Nine days later he
was charged with, and subsequently convicted of, negligent homicide,
analysis having shown an alcohol content of .13 of 1% of alcohol by
weight.2 Defendant made timely objection to the introduction of the
results of the test into evidence upon three grounds which the Circuit
Court certified to the Supreme Court: First, that admission of such
evidence would constitute a violation of the Wisconsin Constitution,
Art. I Sec. 8, which provides that:
"No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."
Second, that admission would violate the Wisconsin Constitution, Art.
I, Sec. 11, which provides that:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."
Third, that admission would violate the Federal Constitution, Four-
teenth Amendment, which provides that:
"[No] state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
13 It is for the jury to decide whether the situation presented to the mind of the
driver was such as would, under all the circumstances present, require him
to operate his vehicle as he did. Ibid., at 286.
14 The Montalto Case is the only recent Wisconsin case dealing with this prob-
lem. See also Suren v. Zuege, 186 Wis. 264, 201 N.W. 722 (1925) which is in
accord with the present decision and Swartz v. Sommerfeldt, 272 Wis. 17, 74
N.W. 2d 632 (1956) in which the standard of care required of emergency
vehicles was not before the Court on appeal.
1274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
2 WIs. STATS. §325.235 (1955).
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